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Abstract
We uncover the short- and long-run structural determinants of the existing
cross-country heterogeneity in public-private pay differentials for a broad set of OECD
countries. We explore micro data (EU-SILC, 2004–2012) and macro data (1970–2014).
Three results stand out. First, when looking at pay gaps based on individual data, more
than half of the cross-sectional variation of the sample can be accounted for by the
degree of exposure to international competition, as well as by the size of the public
sector labor force and its composition (i.e., the intensity in the provision of pure public
goods), while labor market institutions play a very limited role. Second, we find that in
some countries, pay gaps have narrowed down significantly during the recent financial
crisis, this decrease being explained by the widespread process of fiscal consolidation
rather than by changes in the previous factors. Third, we show that in the log run,
openness to international trade and improvements in the institutional quality of
governments are associated with decreases in the public-private wage gap. Our
findings can be rationalized by a body of research stressing noncompetitive wage
settlements in the public sector.
JEL Classification: J31, J45, H50
Keywords: Public sector pay gap, Government monopolistic power, Wage-setting
institutions
1 Introduction
In this paper, we empirically study the short- and long-run structural determinants of the
existing cross-country heterogeneity in public-private pay differentials for a broad set of
OECD countries. It has been argued that the existence of positive wage premia may affect
labor market outcomes because of distortions on the optimal allocation of the labor force
among economic sectors and create overall economy productivity losses.1
An extensive literature has dealt with the estimation of public-private wage differen-
tials in a large number of countries. The differentials tend not to be entirely explained
by the individual attributes of workers and are found to be heterogeneous across coun-
tries both in terms of their size and their sign, even though positive gaps tend to prevail,
thus signaling the existence of a so-called public-private pay gap.2 Overall, unexplained
positive public-private wage differentials tend to be larger for female workers, workers
at the lower end of the wage distribution, and younger workers.3 The existence of earn-
ings differentials between the public and private sectors in a number of countries has also
been highlighted by a strand of papers that uses macro (aggregate) data,4 which stress the
potential distortions in the labor market such a differential may induce.5
© The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Campos et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2017) 6:7 Page 2 of 29
The literature has provided some theoretical explanations to account for the cross-
country heterogeneity in public-private pay gaps. One body of research argues that the
monopolistic power of governments in the provision of public services results in non-
competitive wage settlements. For example, starting from the observation that wage gaps
tend to be larger in countries with lower shares of government employment, some authors
develop models in which a smaller group of public employees derive monopoly power
from a tighter control of the production of public goods/services.6 The link between the
monopolistic power of governments and noncompetitive wage settlements is amplified
by the fact that the objective functions of the government and the private sectors may
differ: whereas the latter is largely guided by market forces and profit constraints, the
former may pursue political motives. For instance, it has been argued that politicians
use public employment for redistributive purposes, directing income towards disadvan-
taged groups,7 or that politicians are likely to link public wage agreements to election
cycles.8,9 In turn, another set of theories stresses the fact that labor market institutions
differ markedly between the public and the private sectors. For example, it has been doc-
umented that union density tends to be higher in the public sector.10 On related grounds,
it is argued that a wage premium arises because of differences in the bargaining power
within the private and public sectors.11 Other explanations are linked to the degree of
public wage-setting centralization of countries.12
Surprisingly enough, there is very limited empirical evidence that could help validate
the alternative theories to explain the public-private pay gap just described. European
Commission (2014) provides simple rank correlations between public wage gaps esti-
mated with 2010 data for 26 European Union (EU) countries and some country charac-
teristics, such as labor market institutions and the size of the government as an employer.
They find a positive correlation between the public-private wage gap and employment
protection legislation, and conjecture that this might arise because higher compensa-
tions are needed to make public employment attractive when private employment is
more strongly protected. They also find a negative correlation with the size of public
employment in the labor force, as also shown by others.13 In turn, within the pub-
lic administration literature, Llorens (2008) studies the determinants of US state-level
public-private wage gaps and finds that, in particular cases, state unemployment, citizen
liberalism, and unionization affect the gap positively.
In this paper, we aim to fill in this gap in the literature by providing broad-based empir-
ical evidence on the variables driving the cross-country variation in public-private wage
premia. To do so, we use two different and complementary data sets to compute wage
gaps. First, we estimate public-private pay gaps for 25 (mostly EU) countries on the basis
of data from the “European Union Survey of Living Conditions”(EU-SILC henceforth) for
the period 2004 to 2012. Following the extant literature, we define public workers as those
employed in the Public Administration, Education, and Health industries, as opposed
to market activities, which constitute the private sector. The estimated public pay gaps
are at the average of the distribution and control for observable characteristics of work-
ers. Second, in order to expand the sample and analyze medium-term determinants, we
use national accounts data for the period 1970–2014, covering 19 developed countries.
In this case, by using aggregate data, we define the public pay gap as the ratio of total
compensation per employee in the general government sector over that of the private
sector.
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Our main findings are the following. First, we show that more than half of the cross-
sectional variation inmicro-data-based public pay gaps over 2004–2012 can be accounted
for by the size and composition (specialization in public or individual goods) of the pub-
lic labor force, as well as exposure to international competition. Second, and on related
grounds, we estimate that wage differentials in some countries have narrowed down sig-
nificantly during the recent financial crisis. Nevertheless, pay gap changes between 2007
and 2012 can be explained by the widespread process of fiscal consolidation rather than
by the previous factors. Third, from a long-run perspective (using macro data), we show
that openness to international trade and improvements in the quality of governments
have been associated with decreases in the public wage gap.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the database, the esti-
mation of the public pay gaps with micro data, and the linkages between different (micro
andmacro) measures of the gap. Section 3 analyzes the determinants of the cross-country
variation of pay gaps. First, of the cross section of gaps estimated with micro data, next
by exploiting the variation witnessed in the recent financial crisis, and, finally, adopting a
long-run perspective. Finally, Section 5 gives concluding remarks.
2 Data and variables
2.1 The public-private pay gap with micro data
As regards sources of micro data, we use the “European Union Statistics on Income and
Living Conditions” (EU-SILC) survey, given its cross-country comparability, data avail-
ability for the pre- and post-crisis periods (2004–2012), and the fact that it covers most of
European Union countries. Our sample includes all EU28 countries (with the exception
of Bulgaria, Malta, Romania, Finland, and Croatia), as well as Norway and Iceland. The
distinction between public and private sector employment is based on NACE (Statistical
Classification of Economic Activities), Rev.2. The most recent data refers to the 2013 EU-
SILC wave, which includes employment and earnings information pertaining to 2012. In
this framework, as it is standard in the literature, the “government sector” is an approx-
imation based on either the aggregation of the O (Public Administration and Defense,
Compulsory Social Security), P (Education), and Q (Health and social work) sectors of
the NACE classification (broad definition), or only the O sector (restricted definition).
With the EU-SILC database, it is not possible to separate public employees from private
sector employees in any of the sectors, being this particularly relevant for activities P and
Q, where private providers are more prevalent.14 In the case of EU-SILC data, the defini-
tion of “wages per employee” is computed based on the individual gross monthly earnings
(including only monetary earnings and excluding financial income from investments,
assets, savings, stocks, and shares) before netting out taxes and social contributions and
the number of hours worked per week in the main job. Note also that the self-employed
are excluded from the analysis.
We estimate the part of the wage gap that cannot be accounted for by (observable) indi-
vidual characteristics. We follow the common approach of running Mincer-type wage
regressions taking the logarithm of gross income per hour as the dependent variable. The
set of covariates includes binary variables denoting married status, low and high educa-
tion, managerial position, part-time job, gender, year, and region (2-digit NUTS) fixed
effects, as well as a second-degree polynomial in experience (or age and age squared
whenever information on experience is not available).15
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The specification also includes a binary variable (public) denoting that the individual
works in the public sector. Thus, as per the usual approach, the coefficient associated
with the variable (public) represents the earnings differential (evaluated at the mean of
the distribution) that remains once the other relevant determinants are controlled for, and
if estimated to be positive, it is labeled a public-private pay differential/premium/gap (or
pay penalty if negative).16
The specification for each country looks as follows:
yi = Xiβ + δpublici +
2012∑
t=2004
λt + εi (1)
where εi is an iid idiosyncratic error term and the coefficients β , δ, and
∑2012
t=2004 λt are
estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). Table 1 shows the estimates of the coefficient
δ, i.e., the public sector pay gap. In a subsequent section of the paper, we will identify the
variables that account for the cross-sectional heterogeneity of δ, its evolution during the
recent financial crisis, and its dynamics during the last decades.
Individual characteristics account for a substantial fraction of the observed public-
private wage gap, but there remains an unaccounted gap. For the pool of euro area
countries, the estimated wage gap conditional on characteristics over the 2004–2012
period for the broad NACE proxy to the government sector (OPQ sectors) is 60% lower
than the estimated unconditional wage gap (Table 1, column (2) versus (1)), since the
observable characteristics between the two sectors are different, e.g., in the public sec-
tor, workers are on average better educated than in the private sector. For the period
2004–2012 as a whole, positive wage gaps are estimated for 21 out of the 23 analyzed EU
countries. Conditional wage gaps are larger for countries that suffered fiscal stress over
the crisis (Cyprus, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Greece, and Italy) and Luxembourg and tend
to be higher when a more restricted definition of the government sector (NACEO sector)
is considered (Table 1, column (5)), i.e., when looking at the sectors in which there exists
a quasi-monopoly power of the government as service provider. There has been a reduc-
tion in some countries in the estimated (conditional) wage gap as a consequence of the
economic crisis and the recent fiscal consolidation episode (Table 1, column (4) versus
(3)). For the euro area as a whole (pool), the estimated conditional wage gap for the period
2010–2012 for the broad NACE proxy of government-related activities is 40% lower than
the one estimated for the 2004–2009 period. In general, the wage premium falls more
markedly in countries with larger pre-crisis levels.
2.2 The public-private pay gap with macro data
Regarding macro (aggregate) data, we focus on the general government sector as defined
by the National Accounts, for the period 1970–2014. The longer time span is the first
advantage of complementingmicro-based pay gaps with gaps computed frommacro data.
In this latter case, our sample covers 19 developed countries, those for which we were able
to gather long time series on the relevant variables: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany,
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, UK, and USA. The primary source of government wage bill
data and all macroeconomic variables used throughout the study (GDP, prices, total econ-
omy wages and employment, population) is Eurostat for EU countries and the OECD
(Economic Outlook Database) for non-EU countries (see Table 7 of Appendix 1 for the
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Table 1 Estimates of the public pay gap EU-SILC 25 countries
Full sample Full sample Pre-crisis Crisis Full sample
2004–2012 2004–2012 2004–2009 2010–2012 2004–2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. variable: gross income per hour
Euro area pool 0.182∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Belgium (BE) 0.064∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.001 0.018∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007)
Germany (DE) 0.096∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.009 0.118∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005)
Estonia (EE) 0.037∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014)
Ireland (IE) 0.347∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012)
Greece (GR) 0.382∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007)
Spain (ES) 0.369∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
France (FR) 0.045∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.020) (0.008)
Italy (IT) 0.285∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Cyprus (CY) 0.508∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010)
Latvia (LV) 0.211∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.016) 0.018)
Lithuania (LT) 0.242∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.023)
Luxembourg (LU) 0.272∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
Netherlands (NL) 0.137∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011)
Austria (AT) 0.186∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008)
Portugal (PT) 0.422∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009)
Slovenia (SI) 0.244∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.019) (0.016)
Slovakia (SK) 0.064∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007)
Czech Republic (CZ) 0.102∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
Denmark (DK) 0.035∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.041∗ 0.027∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.022) (0.016)
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Table 1 Estimates of the public pay gap EU-SILC 25 countries (Continued)
Hungary (HU) 0.180 ∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.075 ∗∗∗ −0.003 0.128∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Poland (PL) 0.301∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Sweden (SE) −0.040∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.021) (0.017)
United Kingdom (UK) 0.088∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.013 0.129 ∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Iceland (IS) −0.037∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗ 0.022∗
(0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.020) (0.013)
Norway (NO) −0.067∗∗∗ −0.135∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.013) (0.014) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public sector defined as Broad Broad Broad Broad Restricted
Notes: This table shows the estimates of the public sector pay gap conditional on observable characteristics (Eq. 1). The public
sector is defined as industries (NACE Rev. 2) O (Public Administration), P (Education), and Q (Health and social work), except
column (5), where the public sector only comprises the industry O. The dependent variable is gross income per hour, computed
as the ratio of individual gross monthly earnings (including only monetary earnings and excluding financial income from
investments, assets, savings, stocks, and shares) before netting out taxes and social contributions and the number of hours
worked per week in the main job. Controls include the following: binary variables denoting public sector (which coefficient is
shown) married status, low and high education, managerial position, part-time job, gender, year, and region fixed effects, as well
as a second-degree polynomial in experience (or age and age squared whenever information on experience is not available). The
specification of column (1) does not include observable characteristics (unconditional public sector pay gap). Robust standard
errors are in parenthesis, clustered at the individual level
Significance levels: ∗10%; ∗∗5%; ∗∗∗1%
definition and sources of all the variables used in the paper). General government employ-
ment data, in turn, are taken from the OECD database. The measure of aggregate (macro)
wages chosen for our analysis is compensation per employee. The main reason why we
focus on total compensation rather than on wages is data limitations in terms of sample
size and coverage of countries in our sample. We compute compensation per employee
using compensation of employees and employment data. Compensation of private sector
employees is defined as total economy compensation of employees minus compensa-
tion of government employees. Compensation per private employee is defined as private
compensation of employees divided by total employees minus government employment
minus self-employment. In Fig. 1a, b, we show the evolution over time of public-private
pay differentials for a selection of countries. The evolution of the wage gaps is to a high
extent country-specific, although there exists a pattern of decreasing pay gaps in the
1970s, stabilization, and a subsequent increase since the 1990s, at least for some coun-
tries. Regarding the level, countries in northern Europe have lower and negative pay
differentials when compared with other EU countries, the USA, and Japan.
The use of macro data allow us to use a delimitation of the government sector, the
general government, that is more accurate that the approximation based on nonmarket
activities (NACE sectors O, P, and Q) used in the previous section.17 The main disadvan-
tage is that the wage gap thus computed does not control for characteristics of the labor
force; therefore, it tends to be larger. We will address this bias on a subsequent section
by performing our regressions in first differences, hence removing this bias in levels. Our
implicit assumption is that the bias remains relatively constant over time.
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a b
c d
Fig. 1 Public-private pay differentials computed from macro data and comparison with micro-based pay
gaps. Notes: Panels a and b show the evolution of public-private pay differentials (computed from macro
data) for a selection of countries. Panel c compares the public sector pay gap conditional on observed worker
characteristics (EU-SILC, see Eq. 1) with the wage gap computed from aggregate macro data (National
Accounts). Panel d compares the latter with the public sector pay gap computed from micro data (EU-SILC)
unconditional on observed characteristics. With the exception of Luxembourg, the cross-country patterns of
micro vs. macro pay gaps are similar
In Fig. 1c, d, we compare the wage gaps computed from macro data with those com-
puted from micro data, both conditional and unconditional on characteristics (columns
(2) and (1) of Table 1, respectively), for the group of countries present in both samples over
the sample period in which they overlap (2004–2012). As expected, the wage gaps com-
puted frommacro data are generally larger but are much closer to the unconditional wage
gaps computed from micro data. More importantly, the cross-country patterns observed
in themicro data are preserved in themacro aggregates; hence, the analysis with aggregate
data is meaningful.18
2.3 Hypotheses to be tested
We characterize the variables that explain the cross-country variation in the public-
private wage gap. Our choice of covariates relies on a body of research that has rational-
ized the existence of public-private wage differentials. Hence, we view our paper as an
empirical test of these theories. According to the literature, conditional on characteris-
tics, public and private sector workers can be paid differently for two broad reasons: (i)
the government is the only provider of certain goods and services, which may generate
noncompetitive wage settlements. Also, the private and the public sectors may have dif-
ferent objective functions: whereas the former is a profit maximizer, the latter may pursue
Campos et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2017) 6:7 Page 8 of 29
other objectives such as vote maximization and redistribution, which also generate non-
competitive wage policies. (ii) Wage-setting institutions may differ between the private
and the public sector (union density, collective bargaining, centralization, etc.).
We proxy for the monopolistic power of governments with four variables. The first is
the ratio of public employment over total employment, which accounts for the size of the
government sector as an employer. This variable is expected to correlate negatively with
the public wage gap: a smaller public labor force is more likely to form an insider group
of workers that enjoy market power in the supply of labor to the public sector and hence
can settle more favorable wage policies. The second is the ratio of Public Administration
employees over total public employees. This accounts for the composition of the public
labor force, whether it is tilted towards the provision of pure public goods (those in the
Public Administration, where the public sector faces limited competition from the private
sector) or to individual goods (like Health and Education, where competition from the
private sector is higher). Hence, it is expected to correlate positively with the public wage
premium. Third is government effectiveness (from the Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors), which proxy for the institutional quality of the public sector, which are expected to
have a negative correlation with the wage gap. Higher wage gaps, being possibly the result
of distortions in the economy, are less likely to exist if the quality of institutions is high.
And fourth is exposure to international competition. This is expected to have a negative
correlation with the wage gap, as foreign competition can help increase the efficiency and
discipline the process of setting wages in the economy.19 We measure exposure to inter-
national competition with the share of tradable sectors (agriculture and manufacturing)
in total value added. We also use an index of openness, the ratio of imports and exports
over GDP.
Our test on the second set of theories relies also on four variables. First is the measure
of howmuch legislation protect workers (OECD), namely the degree of employment pro-
tection in the economy, which is expected to correlate positively with the wage gap. In
view of the theories highlighting wage-setting institutions, we expect that countries with
a higher protection of employment will exhibit higher public pay gaps, since the better
the conditions to work in the private sector, the higher the required wages in the public
sector in order to attract workers. Second, countries with a higher trade union density
(both in the public and in the private sectors) will exhibit generally lower wage gaps, since
trade unions are more likely to reduce the dispersion of wages by collective bargaining.
Regarding the relationship between union density and the wage gap, probably the crucial
determinant is the difference in union density between the public and the private sector.
We test if this variable has predictive power in explaining the wage gap, but our analysis is
limited by a too small number of observations with the available data. Third, we include
an indicator of whether wages in the government sector are settled by collective bargain-
ing as opposed to unilateral decisions. Collective bargaining is more likely to reduce the
wage gap, if the bargaining process involves independent bodies that take into account the
labor conditions in the economy. Finally, we include an indicator of centralization in the
update of government wages. If wage updates in the government sector are centralized,
the wage gap is expected to be higher, as public wages are more likely to deviate from the
conditions of local labor markets.
Our choice of variables referring to each class of models stems from the empirical impli-
cations they entail. We stress size, composition, quality, and efficiency of the public sector
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as more related to the monopolistic power of governments and labor market institutions
as more related to public wage settlements. It must be stressed though that this taxonomy
is sometimes not straightforward, and some variables could be justified in the context of
both types of models. We follow this approach to ease exposition and because it provides
a suitable guidance to specify the regressions.
3 The determinants of the public-private wage gap
3.1 Cross-sectional determinants of the micro estimates
Given that our OLS cross-section regressions are performed on a small number of obser-
vations (25 countries for which we have estimates of the wage gap), we first explore the
relationship of the wage gap with the variables linked to the monopolistic power of the
government sector and, separately, to those proxying for wage-setting institutions. In a
third specification, we add together those variables that were significant in the first stage
and also add other proxies for economic conditions, namely per capita GDP, deficit, debt,
and GDP growth, in order to check the robustness of the results.
3.1.1 The governmentmonopolistic power and the wage gap
We start by drawing the scatterplots of the variables capturing the monopolistic power of
governments with the wage gap (see Fig. 2), where the corresponding bivariate regressions
are showed in Table 8 in the Appendix 2. A simple inspection of the raw data reveals
that some of the patterns predicted by the theory hold (unconditionally) in our sample
of countries. We find that in countries with smaller public labor forces, public workers
relatively concentrated in Public Administration, and with less effective governments , pay
gaps are significantly larger. Also, less exposure to international competition is associated
with higher gaps, although this relationship is not statistically significant.
Moreover, some consistent patterns across country groups are apparent. For example,
the Nordic countries (Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) are characterized by large
public labor forces in which the share of Health and Education is relatively higher (see
Fig. 2a, b), two features that, according to the theories developed by the literature, sup-
port the finding that these countries experience the lowest pay gaps. Furthermore, the
Nordic countries are the best performers in government effectiveness, a feature that also
goes in favor of low gaps. On the opposite side, theMediterranean nations (Cyprus, Spain,
Greece, Italy, and Portugal) are characterized by large public labor forces specialized in
Public Administration and relatively low levels of government effectiveness; thus, they
deliver higher pay gaps. Some Central and Eastern European countries (Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) render roughly aver-
age wage gaps, which is consistent with shares of Public Administration workers also
around the average. Yet, they are characterized by small public labor forces and low
levels of government effectiveness. The remaining Central European countries (Austria,
Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, France, and the UK) have also average pay gaps, which
goes in line with government effectiveness levels slightly above the mean. Also, Germany,
France, and the UK employ neither small nor big public labor forces, while the share of
public employees is large in Belgium and the Netherlands and small in Austria. Two coun-
tries do not seem to belong to a specified category. Luxembourg and Ireland undergo the
third and fourth largest pay gaps, respectively, in our sample, yet they enjoy high-quality
governments and a fair amount of public employees. Despite this, they behave according
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c d
Fig. 2 a–d The monopolistic power of governments and the wage gap: bivariate relationships. Notes: This
figure shows the scatterplots of the variables capturing the monopolistic power of governments with the
public sector conditional pay gap. The pay gap is estimated from micro data for the period 2004–2012; see
Table 1. Panels a to d show the correlation between the wage gap and the share of public employees, the
ratio of Public Administration Employees (over public employees), the government effectiveness and the
share of tradable sectors in total value added, respectively
to the theory in the sense that they allocate a relatively high amount of workers to Public
Administration, rather than to Health and Education. Overall, these results suggest that
the characteristics linked to themonopolistic power of governments, which are somewhat
comparable across countries within each group, help understand the cross-country vari-
ation of the public sector pay gap. Furthermore, to the extent that some theoretical works
have rationalized the observed relationships, this evidence provides support to them.
The bivariate relationships just discussed may overlook relevant interactions between
the explanatory variables that can affect the correlations uncovered above. For this reason,
it is worth exploring the relationship of these variables with the wage gap in a multivari-
ate regression framework. In Table 2, we show the results of regressing the wage gap on
all the variables capturing the degree of the monopolistic power of governments.20 The
results tend to confirm the previous findings, with some qualifications. Column (1) shows
that, conditional on the rest of the covariates, countries with a lower percentage of public
employees, a composition of the public workforce tilted towards goods that are provided
exclusively by the public sector, and that are less opened to international competition,
have significantly higher wage gaps. Quantitatively, a one standard deviation decrease in
the percentage of public employees (5.1 percentage points, being the mean 29.0%) is asso-
ciated with an increase in the public pay gap of 5.2 percentage points (or 0.41 standard
deviations, being the mean 8.5%); a one standard deviation increase in the share of public
workers in the Public Administration with respect to overall public workers (8.3 percent-
age points, being the mean 32.9%) is associated with an increase of the public pay gap
Campos et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2017) 6:7 Page 11 of 29
Table 2 Determinants of the public sector pay gap: government monopolistic power
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable: NACE proxy to government sector wage gap (2004–2012)
% public employees −0.0103∗∗−0.0110∗∗−0.0073∗ −0.0142∗∗∗−0.0076∗
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0032) (0.0039)
% public administration 0.0070∗∗ 0.0075∗∗∗ 0.0083∗∗∗0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0080∗∗∗
employees (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0027)
Government effectiveness −0.0197
(0.0383)
% value added tradable sectors −0.0091∗∗−0.0087∗∗ −0.0059 −0.0093∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0031) (0.0037) (0.0033)
% public employees (over population) −0.0195∗∗
(0.0077)




Constant 0.3393 0.3130 0.0253 0.0045 0.4718∗∗∗ 0.0552
(0.2308) (0.2006) (0.1615) (0.1568) (0.1589) (0.1843)
Observations 24 24 25 24 24 24
Adjusted R-squared 0.59 0.60 0.49 0.56 0.54 0.49
Notes: This table shows the regression of the public sector pay gap on country characteristics linked to the government
monopolistic power in the provision of public services. The regression in column (6) excludes Luxembourg, as its openness is an
outlier with respect to the sample (larger than the mean plus 5 standard deviations). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis
Significance levels: ∗10%; ∗∗5%; ∗∗∗1%
of 5.8 percentage points; and a one standard deviation increase in the share of tradable
sectors in total value added (5.4 percentage points, being the mean 17.7%) is associated
with a decrease in the wage gap of 5.0 percentage points. It is worth noting that this vari-
able did not render a significant relationship with the pay gap in the bivariate framework
(although it had the same sign), while the opposite happens for government effectiveness.
This is so because there is a negative correlation, at least in our sample, between the qual-
ity of governments and the composition of public employment. That is, countries with
more efficient governments employ a lower share of workers in Public Administration
(relative to Health and Education), and they have on average lower gaps. Regarding expo-
sure to international competition, the multivariate framework underlines the importance
of accounting for the effectiveness of government to empirically verify the correlation
between international competition and the wage gap, since, conditional on the latter, more
exposure to international competition leads to significantly lower gaps. In column (2), we
remove the government effectiveness from the regression and find that the other three
variables remain statistically significant. The R-squared from this specification shows that
these three variables explain 60% of the variation of the wage gaps in our sample.
Given the small number of observations of these regressions, it is important to check
that no outliers drive these results. In Fig. 3a–c, we plot the correlation between each
covariate of the specification in column (2) with the dependent variable once the effect
of the other covariates is removed, i.e., the partial correlations.21 We can see that these
correlations are genuine and are not driven by extreme observations.




Fig. 3 The public pay gap and potential determinants. Notes: This figure shows the partial correlations
between the public sector pay gap and country characteristics. Panels a to c show partial correlations with
characteristics linked to the government monopolistic power in the provision of public services; see column
(2) of Table 2. Specifically, panels a, b, and c show the partial correlation of the size of the public sector (share
of public sector employees), the composition of the public sector (specialization in public goods), and the
exposure to international trade (specialization in tradable goods), respectively. Panels d and e show the
correlation (in deviations with respect to the mean) between labor market institutions and the public sector
pay gap. Panel d shows the correlation of an index of employment protection legislation (column (2) of
Table 3) and panel e of an index of trade union density (column (3)). Finally, panel f shows the correlation (in
deviations with respect to the mean) between improvements in the CAPB during the crisis and changes in
the public sector pay gap; see column (1) of Table 4. Improvements in the CAPB are computed as the CAPB in
2012 minus the minimum in the period 2007–2011. Changes in the public sector pay gap correspond to the
same period
The following columns of Table 2 check the robustness of these findings. Column (3)
removes the share of tradable sectors in total value added. The size and composition of
the public labor force remain significant explanatory variables of the public pay gap, being
able to explain almost half of its variance. Columns (4) to (6) substitute each covariate by
an alternative measure, capturing the same economic concept. Column (4) computes the
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size of the public labor force as the percentage of public employees over population, yield-
ing an even lower point estimate. Column (5) substitutes the share of public employees in
the Public Administration by the percentage of total compensation of employees aimed
at collective goods, whose provision is carried out exclusively by the government sector,
as opposed to individual goods, such as health and education (the source of these data
is COFOG). This variable is positively correlated with the public pay gap, reinforcing the
message that a higher monopolistic power of the government sector is associated with a
higher wage gap. Finally, column (6) substitutes the share of tradable sectors in total value
added by log openness. In this case, this variable enters nonsignificantly in the regression,
although with the expected sign. Overall, these robustness checks are highly supportive
of the main findings: the positive association between the public sector pay gap and the
monopolistic power that the public sector enjoys in the production of certain goods and
services.
Given that both the size and composition of public sector employees are important in
explaining the wage gap, it is worth noting that the sign of the latter makes more sense
when the private sector is more involved in Health and Education, which renders the
former variable, as constructed from the broad definition of the government sector, less
accurate. In order to address this concern, we have replaced the percentage of public
employees constructed from the broad definition with the percentage of public employ-
ees constructed from the restricted definition (i.e., the ratio of Public Administration
employees over total employment). We found that the results were very similar. A larger
amount of public employees is associated to a significantly lower wage gap, while, condi-
tional on size, the more specialization in public goods, the larger the wage gap. Therefore,
the results do not seem to be driven by the specific definition of public sector workers.
While it is very difficult to empirically disentangle the specific mechanisms leading
to the observed cross-country correlations, we have delved deeper into the relation-
ship between openness and the wage gap. Specifically, it may be the case that well-run
countries have public sectors with low pay gaps and very competitive private sectors,
which in turn would lead to more openness to international competition. This would sug-
gest that a third factor, the private sector competitiveness, would explain the correlation
between openness and the wage gap. While this concern was partly addressed by adding
to the regression the government effectiveness, which controls for the business environ-
ment of each country, we have also added a measure of private sector competitiveness in
order to check whether conditional on it there is still an association between exposure
to international competition and the wage gap. Specifically, we added the OECD prod-
uct market regulation index, which captures the degree of pro-competition regulation in
product markets.22 Interestingly, we find that conditional on this variable, we still find
that exposure to international competition is significantly associated to the wage gap.
Indeed, the coefficient of the share of tradable sectors in total value added remains basi-
cally unchanged, and the product market regulation index enters nonsignificantly. This
result suggests that international competition may discipline the public and private wages
in the economy at least beyond the implementation of policies to promote competition.
3.1.2 Wage-setting institutions and the wage gap
In Table 3, we test the theories that link the wage gap with the wage-setting institu-
tions that prevail in the public vs. the private sector. In the joint regression of the wage
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Table 3 Determinants of the public sector pay gap: different wage-setting institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable: NACE proxy to government sector wage gap (2004–2012)
Employment protection 0.0415 0.0914∗
Legislation (0.0420) (0.0496)







Trade union density (0.0031)
Constant 0.0136 −0.1688 0.1703∗∗∗ 0.0435 0.1252∗∗∗ 0.0677∗∗
(0.1098) (0.1426) (0.0326) (0.0973) (0.0239) (0.0242)
Observations 20 23 22 11 23 23
Adjusted R-squared 0.14 0.07 0.32 −0.10 −0.01 0.18
Notes: This table shows the regression of the public sector pay gap on cross-country differences in labor market institutions.
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis
Significance levels: ∗10%; ∗∗5%; ∗∗∗1%
gap against employment protection, trade union density, collective bargaining, and cen-
tralization of wage updates, none of the covariates is statistically significant, although
employment protection, trade union density, and centralization bear the signs predicted
by the theory; see column (1).
In the following columns, we consider the bivariate relationships of each of these vari-
ables with the public pay gap. In column (2), we find that a higher protection of private
employment is associated with a significantly higher pay gap. Quantitatively, it means
that a one standard deviation increase in employment protection is associated with a 3.9
percentage point increase in the public wage gap (0.34 standard deviations). The simple
correlation (in deviations with respect to the mean) is displayed in Fig. 3d. We can see
that the country groups identified in the previous section shed light on interpreting this
result. The Nordic countries display below-average levels of employment protection and
low pay gaps, while Southern European countries render exactly the opposite. However, it
is worth noting that the Nordic nations exhibit lower gaps than predicted by employment
protection, suggesting that other forces drive the gaps down, which is consistent with the
pattern of trade union density and the wage gap that we describe below. At the mean of
both the wage gap and employment protection lie Central and Eastern European coun-
tries. Finally, the case of the UK stands out, since the very low employment protection
help rationalize a below-average public sector pay gap.
The next column shows the association of the trade union density with the pay gap.
We find that a one standard deviation increase in trade union density is associated with a
6.8 percentage point decrease in the wage gap. The correlation displayed in Fig. 3e makes
apparent that this relationship is driven by the Nordic countries. Actually, removing them
from the regression yields a nonsignificant relationship between both variables. More-
over, the variable trade union density corresponds to the whole economy. If we consider
instead the difference in trade union density between the public and the private sector,
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we do not find a significant relationship with the public pay gap; see column (4). Nev-
ertheless, this result must be taken with caution as the number of observations of this
regression is very low. We also consider the relationship between the wage gap and the
coverage of collective bargaining agreements, which may capture better the pay homoge-
nization induced by trade unions. This relationship is negative, as expected by theory, but
not statistically significant (the p value is 0.17, not shown).
In column (5), we show that there is no significant bivariate relationship between the
wage gap and wages being set by collective bargaining. On the contrary, countries where
wage updates are carried out in a centralizedmanner have on average a wage gap 10.8 per-
centage points higher than countries where wage updates are decided in a decentralized
manner; see column (6). In this regard, it is worth noting that five out of the six coun-
tries exhibiting the largest gaps (Cyprus, Luxembourg, Ireland Portugal, and Greece) are
characterized by centralized public wage updates, the exception being Spain. Moreover,
there are only two countries out of nine (Hungary and France) where wage updates are
centralized and the pay gap is below average.
Overall, the results discussed in this section provide some evidence on the link between
wage-setting institutions across countries and the public pay gap. However, it must be
noted that they explain less of the cross-country variation of the wage gap than theories
stressing the monopolistic environment in which governments operate, and the correla-
tions lose their statistical significance once they are computed in a multivariate regression
framework.
3.1.3 Further results in the cross section
The findings discussed in the previous two sections are further confirmedwhenwe imple-
ment a horse race between both theories (not shown).23 Specifically, we add together the
proxies for the monopolistic power of governments and the wage-setting institutions (the
latter added one at a time). When we regress the public wage gap against the percentage
of public employees, the share of public employees in Public Administration, the share of
tradable sectors in total value added, and the employment protection legislation, it turns
out that only those variables reflecting themonopolistic power of the public sector are sig-
nificant in explaining the wage gap, having similar coefficients as those found in Table 2.
This result is confirmed when we include the variable trade union density, whose coeffi-
cient is not statistically significant. Moreover, if we add the indicator of centralized wage
updates, it also enters nonsignificantly.
We also checked that these results are robust to excluding the years of the finan-
cial crisis, which may introduce some noise in the relationship between the wage
gap and its fundamentals. Actually, the estimates are more precisely estimated when
using the sample 2004–2007, and none of the economic conditions have explanatory
power.24
In addition, we also check the robustness of the results to adopting a narrower definition
of the public sector. We restrict it to Public Administration (industry O), i.e., we consider
Education and Health (industries P and Q) to belong to the private sector. We find that
the public sector wage gap under such a definition is also significantly related to the size
and composition of public sector employees, as well as exposure to international trade.
Labor market institutions do not have predictive power in explaining the wage gap, once
the other variables are controlled for.25
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We also analyzed the relationship between the overall pay gap and that of female work-
ers and workers at the lower end of the income distribution. If the public sector follows
more egalitarian practices in the setting of wages, (at least part of ) the overall pay gap
may be the result of discrimination (for example, to women) in the private sector. We
found that indeed in almost all countries, the conditional pay gap is larger for female
workers and workers at the first quartile of the income distribution; see Appendix 2.26
However, the cross-country differences in the pay gap of women and low-income workers
are virtually the same as those of the overall population (the correlations are .99 and .98,
respectively). Hence, the structural determinants uncovered in this section also account
for a large fraction of the cross-country variability in pay gaps of these groups. To sum
up, then, we find support that the government monopolistic power explains a large part
of the cross-country variation in the public pay gap, at least in our sample of 25 (mostly)
EU countries.27
3.2 Exploiting changes during the financial crisis
During the last few years, a large sample of EU countries have undergone fiscal consolida-
tion processes of different degrees aimed at controlling increasing fiscal deficits stemming
from the financial crisis. In this regard, measures focused on restraining the government
wage bill played a significant role, with actions on this front being adopted by several
countries. We showed in Table 1 that wage gaps in some countries were reduced during
the crisis/consolidation period, while in others they remained constant or even increased.
Thus, in this section, we study whether the change observed in the gap during this period
can be linked to changes in the determinants of the previous section or to the effect of fis-
cal consolidationmeasures. Before we proceed, we raise a flag in interpreting the results of
this section, given our small sample size, the turbulent times associated with the financial
crisis, and the different set of austerity measures undertaken in each country, which may
introduce additional noise in the estimations. Moreover, it must be stressed that the pay
gap reflects wage developments in both the public and the private sector. Fiscal retrench-
ment may squeeze public sector wages, while, in parallel, labor market deregulation can
reduce wages in the private sector. Hence, differences in labor market developments may
result in heterogeneous cross-country outcomes in wage growth and eventually may bring
about wage gap increases or decreases.
We define the fiscal effort as the difference in the cyclically adjusted primary bal-
ance (CAPB) between 2012 and the minimum of the period 2007–2011. This definition
takes into account that some countries carried out front-loaded fiscal consolidations,
while others delayed this process. Of the 23 EU countries in our sample, during the
period 2007–2012, 18 countries posted the lowest CAPB in 2008–2010, 1 in 2007, 3 in
2011, and only 1 exhibited the worst CAPB in 2012, which was nevertheless contained
(Denmark, with a CAPB of 1.7 percent of GDP). Armed with this definition, we study
whether countries that made larger fiscal efforts brought the public pay gap down more.
Column (1) of Table 4 shows that indeed improvements in the CAPB have been
associated with significant decreases in the public sector pay gap in our sample. The
point estimate suggests that a country improving its CAPB in 3.3 percentage points of
GDP (the average of our sample) was able to reduce the public pay gap 2.5 percentage
points. Note that the average reduction of the pay gap is 1.5 percentage points; hence,
this decrease is very large. Figure 3f shows the correlation (in deviations with respect
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Table 4 The public pay gap during the crisis: determinants of change between 2007 and 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable: change in NACE proxy to government sector wage gap (2012—year of worst CAPB)
12−minCAPBc −0.0076∗∗∗ −0.0066∗∗∗ −0.0076∗∗∗ −0.0081∗∗∗ −0.0106∗∗∗ −0.0061∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0016)
12−min% public employeesc −0.0061
(0.0073)
12−min% public administration 0.0010
employeesc (0.0031)
12−min% value added tradable 0.0090
sectorsc (0.0107)
12−min employment protection −0.1185∗∗
legislationc (0.0551)
12−min trade union densityc 0.0053
(0.0075)
Constant 0.0097 0.0126 0.0105 0.0050 0.0010 0.0034
(0.0142) (0.0130) (0.0159) (0.0155) (0.0123) (0.0149)
Observations 23 23 23 22 20 19
Adjusted R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.18 0.25 0.18
Notes: This table shows the regression of the change in the public sector pay gap on the improvement in the cyclically adjusted
primary balance (CAPB) during the crisis. This improvement is computed as the CAPB in 2012 minus the minimum in the period
2007–2011. The change in the public pay gap corresponds to the same time period. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis
Significance levels: ∗10%; ∗∗5%; ∗∗∗1%
to the mean) of the change in the CAPB and the change in the wage gap. Note that
the slope is affected by the huge improvement in the CAPB of Greece, of more than
10 percentage points above the average. If Greece is removed from the regression, the
point estimate is even lower (−0.0092), although its statistical significance decreases
(to a p value of 0.08).
The association between the improvement in the CAPB and the evolution of the pay
gap can be explained, at least to some extent, by the discretionary actions taken by
governments during this period.28 For example, five of the six countries that experi-
enced the largest decreases in the pay gap adopted public wage cuts during the crisis:
Greece (2010–2014), Slovenia (2012–2014), Spain (2012–2014), Latvia (2009–2010), and
Portugal (2011–2014). In contrast, increases in the wage gap during this period weremore
likely in countries with no measures regarding public wages (Germany and Lithuania) or
wage freezes (France and Belgium). There are two countries that deviate from this pattern.
On the one hand, Hungary experienced a sharp decrease in the pay gap, despite resort-
ing only to wage growth controls in 2007–2008. On the other hand, Cyprus implemented
wage freezes and cuts during 2011–2014, and still, the estimated wage gap increased by a
substantial amount. As mentioned before, these patterns can be the result of outweighing
developments in the private sector.
Columns (2) to (6) of Table 4 explores whether the variables that explain the hetero-
geneity in the levels of the wage gap can also account for the evolution during the crisis.
It turns out that no variable enters significantly, suggesting that their effects are mainly
felt in the long run. The only exception is the employment protection legislation, which
enters significantly but with an opposite sign (more labor protection being associated
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with a lower wage gap). This result, which is at odds with theory, is driven by two coun-
tries, Estonia and Slovakia, which elicited legislation to reduce the protection of workers,
but at the same time experienced increases in the public pay gap.
4 Long-run determinants of the public pay gap
To identify the long-run determinants of the dynamics of the public pay gap, we run the
following regression:
Wage Gapct = β ′X′ct +
∑
t
λt + εct (2)
where Wage Gapct is the change in the macro wage gap between t and t − 1; Xct are
changes in possible determinants of the dynamics of the wage gap, namely percentage
of public employees, openness, share of public employees in Public Administration, gov-
ernment effectiveness, employment protection, and trade union density; and
∑
t λt are
period fixed effects. The estimation is carried out by pooled OLS. Following the literature
on growth, in order to remove the effects of the business cycle, each period is a 5-year
average.
Table 5 shows the results. In column (1), we start by studying the relationship between
the dynamics of the wage gap and those of the size of the public labor force and exposure
to trade. The availability of data for these two variables allows us to estimate the regres-
sion covering the whole period 1975 to 2014 (eight 5-year periods). We find that increases
in the size of the labor force and in exposure to foreign competition are significantly
Table 5 Long-run determinants of the public pay gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable: general government sector “macro” wage gapct
% public employeesct −0.0178∗∗∗ −0.0087 −0.0180∗∗ −0.0340∗∗ −0.0131 −0.0336∗
(0.0068) (0.0183) (0.0089) (0.0162) (0.0112) (0.0176)
Opennessct −0.0016∗∗ −0.0021∗∗ −0.0016∗∗ −0.0020∗∗∗ −0.0005 −0.0019∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0007)
% public administration 1.4048
employeesct (1.3675)






Trade union densityct −0.0023
(0.0059)
5-year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time period 1975–2014 1980–2014 1985–2014 2000–2014 1990–2014 2000–2014
Observations 146 56 110 57 91 57
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.13 0.21 0.36 0.17 0.28
Notes: This table shows the regression of 5-year changes in the macro wage gap on 5-year changes of country characteristics
linked to the government monopolistic power in the provision of public services and labor market institutions (long-run
determinants of the public pay gap, Eq. (2)). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis
Significance levels: ∗10%; ∗∗5%; ∗∗∗1%
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associated with reductions in the public sector pay gap. The point estimates suggest that
an increase of one standard deviation in the change of the percentage of public employees
(1.5 percentage points) is associated with a decrease of 2.7 percentage points (0.29 stan-
dard deviations) in the change of the wage gap. Also, an increase of one standard deviation
in the change of the openness ratio (9.4 percentage points) is associated with a decrease
of 1.6 percentage points (.17 standard deviations) in the change of the wage gap. This last
association is very robust to different specifications, whereas the relationship between the
percentage of public employees and the wage gap, although always negative, is somewhat
less stable (see the following columns). In column (2), we include as an additional determi-
nant the first difference of the share of public workers that work in Public Administration.
The lower availability of data for this variable reduces our estimation to a shorter time
period and therefore decreases considerably the number of observations. The point esti-
mate suggests that increases in this ratio are associated with increases in the wage gap, but
opposite to the cross-sectional regressions, the relationship is not statistically significant
(p value is 0.31). In column (3), we include the first difference of an index of government
quality (the International Country Risk Guide Indicator of Quality of Government), which
captures the level of efficiency of the public sector. This index has the advantage that is
available for all countries in our sample and for a long time period (1984–2012). We see
that improvements in the quality of government are associated with lower wage gaps (in
first differences). A one standard deviation increase in the change of government qual-
ity is associated with a 2.7 percentage point decrease in the change of the pay gap, which
is 0.34 standard deviations, being this relationship statistically significant. Moreover, this
relationship holds when we use an alternative measure of the quality of the public sec-
tor, the index of government effectiveness of the Worldwide Governance Indicators; see
column (4). In this case, a one standard deviation increase in the change of government
quality is associated with a significant 2.6 percentage point decrease in the change of the
Fig. 4 Partial correlation between government effectiveness and the public pay gap. Notes: This figure
shows the correlation between 5-year changes in the quality of public services of a country and changes in
the public sector pay gap, once other characteristics are controlled for, namely changes in the number of
public employees and changes in openness; see column (4) of Table 5. The negative slope indicates that
improvements in the quality of public services are associated in the long runwith lower public sector pay gaps
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pay gap, which is 0.33 standard deviations.29 Figure 4 shows that this association is not
driven by outliers, although the estimation comprises just three time periods. Moreover,
the association between improvements in government quality (including either indicator)
and decreases in the pay gap is robust to include country fixed effects in the change of the
wage gap (not shown). With respect to the variables linked to wage-setting institutions,
employment protection and trade union density, we find no statistical relationship with
respect to the wage gap; see columns (5) and (6). Although the sign of employment protec-
tion is positive, it lacks statistical significance, whereas changes of trade union density are
estimated to be uncorrelated with changes in the wage gap. Overall, this long-run anal-
ysis corroborates the importance of accounting for the government monopolistic power
in explaining the wage gap. From a long time period perspective, increases in foreign
competition and improvements in the institutional quality of governments are associated
with significant reductions in the public sector pay gap. The evidence also suggests that
increases in the number of employees are also associated with reductions in the public
sector pay gap, but in this case, the estimates are more noisy.
In Table 6, we test that our strategy to take 5-year averages effectively removed the
effects of the business cycle. We add as additional determinants to the change in the wage
gap the first difference of several proxies of economic conditions, namely real GDP, the
general government deficit, the level of public debt, and the unemployment rate. None
of these variables enter significantly in either regression, whereas the coefficients of per-
centage of public employees, openness, and government effectiveness remain stable and
statistically significant, the only exception being the coefficient of government quality
Table 6 Long-run determinants of the public pay gap: robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. variable: general government sector “macro” wage gapct
% public employeesct −0.0184∗∗ −0.0223∗∗ −0.0194∗ −0.0208∗∗
(0.0087) (0.0099) (0.0101) (0.0100)
Opennessct −0.0015∗ −0.0016∗ −0.0016∗ −0.0016∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Quality of governmentct −0.2381∗ −0.2539∗ −0.3421∗∗ −0.1888
(0.1301) (0.1485) (0.1317) (0.1447)








5-year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time period 1985–2014 1985–2014 1985–2014 1985–2014
Observations 110 99 94 102
Adjusted R-squared 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.21
Notes: This table shows the regression of 5-year changes in the macro wage gap on 5-year changes on country characteristics
linked to the government monopolistic power in the provision of public services and business cycle variables. Robust standard
errors are in parenthesis
Significance levels: ∗10%; ∗∗5%; ∗∗∗1%
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in column (4), with a p value of 0.19. This reassures the robustness of the association
between the dynamics of the government sector and the public pay gap.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we provide descriptive evidence on the determinants of the levels and
dynamics of the public pay premia in a large set of mostly EU countries. We show three
results. First, more than half of the cross-sectional variation in public pay gaps can be
accounted for by the size and composition of the public labor force, as well as exposure
to international competition. Second, the evolution of the gap during the recent financial
crisis is significantly explained by improvements in fiscal positions. Third, openness to
international trade and improvements in the quality of governments have been associated
in the long run with decreases in the public pay gap.
These findings are rationalized by an extensive body of research that stresses that the
noncompetitive environment in which the government sector operates is at the root of
the higher earnings enjoyed in the public sector. Given the important effects this has on
the labor market and the competitiveness of countries, our findings shed some light on
the source of these inefficiencies and help policy makers design public wage bill policies
aimed at providing the correct incentives, improve overall efficiency, and achieve fiscal
soundness.
Endnotes
1 See, for instance, Holm-Hadulla F et al. (2010) and European Commission (2014). On
the more general issue of public employment and compensation reform, see Forni and
Novta N (2016).
2An overwhelming majority of the literature looks at wage level differentials. Never-
theless, some papers look at lifetime values of employment between public and private
sectors, such as Dickson et al. (2014). These authors look at lifetime values instead of
wage levels because they claim that differences in earnings mobility, earnings volatility,
and job risk across sectors occur in many instances and may matter to forward-looking
individuals.
3 For some recent contributions to a fast expanding literature, see Giordano et al. (2015),
Depalo et al. (2015), Lausev (2014), European Commission (2014), or Christofides and
Michael (2013) and the references quoted therein. On related grounds, a strand of the
literature looks at the “politicians’ pay gap” (see in particular Peichl et al. (2013), for the
case of Germany).
4 See for instance Holm-Hadulla F et al. (2010) and the references quoted therein.
5More recently, Cavalcanti and Rodrigues dos Santos (2015) develop an equilibrium
model with endogenous occupational choice among the public and the private sectors,
in which a public-private earnings premium is characterized. They calibrate the model to
the Brazilian economy. They show that the presence of a public-private earnings premium
can generate important allocation effects in the economy and sizable productive losses.
6 See Fernández-de-Córdoba et al. (2012) or Kollintzas et al. (2015). On related grounds,
on the appropriation of resources by the bureaucracy in the form of higher wages, see
Marconi et al. (2009).
7 See, for example, Alesina et al. (2000).
8 See, for example, Matschke (2003).
Campos et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2017) 6:7 Page 22 of 29
9 It has also been argued on theoretical grounds (Becker and Stigler (1974)) that the
public wage premium may serve as an effective policy to fight corruption. Nevertheless,
as discussed by Marconi et al. (2009), this is hard to justify for two main reasons. First,
governments own other instruments to fight corruption. Second, the fight against a high
degree of corruption could demand a much larger budget.
10 See, for example, Visser (2013).
11 See, for instance, Holmlund (1993) and Holmlund (1997).
12 See, for instance, Caponi (2014).
13 See the stylized facts presented by Fernández-de-Córdoba et al. (2012) and Kollintzas
et al. (2015).
14According to ESA 2010, the general government sector consists of “institutional units
which are nonmarket producers whose output is intended for individual and collective
consumption, and are financed by compulsory payments made by units belonging to
other sectors, and institutional units principally engaged in the redistribution of national
income and wealth.” As such, the nonmarket activities O, P, and Q represent the best
proxy for the general government sector when this indicator is not provided. Having
said this, it is worth noting that it is not possible to carry out a broad check on how
well these nonmarket activities encompass general government employees, due to the
lack of across-countries homogeneous datasets. Indeed, there exists heterogeneity across
countries in the public sector involvement in the different sectors of the economy. For
example, according to Danmarks Statistik and the Spanish Labour Force Survey, while
in Denmark, the number of general government employees in the Health and Education
sectors is close to 90% and more than 80%, respectively; in Spain, these percentages are
about 50 and 60%, respectively. On the contrary, the vast majority of workers in sector O
are public sector employees: 94 and 97% in Denmark and Spain, respectively.
15 It must be stressed that there may be other relevant characteristics that affect the
wage differential. In particular, in this study, data limitations prevent us to control for a
number of factors: among others, fringe benefits (which are typically higher in the private
sector) and pension rights (generally higher in the public sector), but also non-monetary
factors, such as job security that is generally larger in the public sector. Finally, our data
do not allow to control for the sample selection bias due to the possibility that sorting of
employees between sectors is not random but occurs on the basis of unobserved char-
acteristics. All this said, it has to be mentioned that the bulk of our results is in line
with previous country-specific analyses with finer data (for a recent contribution, see
Hospido and Moral-Benito (2014) and the references quoted therein). For more details,
see Giordano et al. (2015) and Depalo et al. (2015).
16Other approaches to measure unexplained gaps in mean outcomes comprise the so-
called Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, see Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), and the
alternative proposed by Neumark (1988). We follow the approach of a dummy indicator
for convenience and because it tends to be bounded by the two standard Oaxaca-Blinder
gaps. Moreover, the Neumark (1988) approach systematically overstates the contribution
of observables to mean outcome differences. For a discussion on these four approaches,
see Elder et al. (2010).
17Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that while the choice of macro data sources and
definitions insures the best available degree of harmonization and comparability, there
might be measurement problems both within and across countries. Differences/changes
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in working hours, privatization, differences/changes in the size of the public sector over
time, or changes in the skill composition of the labor force over time might distort the
view on certain issues.
18One country, Luxembourg, significantly deviates: it has a large micro wage gap and
a below-average macro gap. For the sake of transparency, we decided not to drop this
country from the sample. The results are qualitatively very similar had we chosen to do
so (first-differencing removes the largest part of the bias).
19 The main theoretical reference is the Scandinavian model of inflation, see Lindquist
and Vilhelmsson (2006), where the traded-goods sector exerts a “leadership” or “signal-
ing” role which can hold sway on public sector wages. Moreover, Lamo et al. (2013) show
that, in the long run, private wages tend to lead public wages and that the probability of
this happening is more likely the greater is the openness to international trade.
20Note that the dependent variable is estimated from micro data, and hence, it is sub-
ject to uncertainty. We make the assumption that the noise induced by the estimation
is uncorrelated with the country characteristics, and hence, this noise only yields higher
standard errors, which go against finding a significant relationship between the covari-
ates and the dependent variable. This seems reasonable, as Eurostat provides a common
framework for the EU-SILC database. Note also that some of the country characteris-
tics are also obtained from EU-SILC (e.g., the percentage of public employees). For the
same reason, it is reasonable to assume that the possible measurement error is uncorre-
lated with the observed covariates, yielding again only higher variances. Moreover, we try
alternative specifications with additional data sources when this is possible, to check the
robustness of the results. In any case, we are aware of the difficulties of giving a causal
interpretation to the coefficients, as orthogonality between the covariates and the error
term is clearly not guaranteed. Our focus is on checking the cross-country implications
of the theories explaining the wage gap, and we favor a prudent predictive interpretation
of our results.
21 That is, we show the scatterplot of the unexplained part of the dependent variable
and the unexplained part of each covariate of column (2), where the unexplained part is
given by the residuals of the regression on the other covariates. For example, the partial
correlation of the wage gap and the share of public employees (Fig. 3a) is constructed as
follows. First, regress the wage gap on the share of public employees in industry O and
the share of tradable sectors in total value added (the other two covariates of column (2)),
and obtain the residuals. Second, regress the share of public employees on the share of
public employees in industry O and the share of tradable sectors in total value added,
and obtain the residuals. Third, plot both series of residuals. Note that the slope of the
scatterplot is precisely the coefficient reported in column (2) of Table 2, and hence, the
picture allows to determine the existence of outliers driving the estimates. Note also that
Fig. 3d–f show partial correlations of bivariate relationships; hence, they are just simple
scatterplots in deviations with respect to the mean.
22We use the index average of 2003, 2008, and 2013. Arguably, in order to proxy for
competitiveness, one would prefer to add outcome variables, rather than a proxy of reg-
ulation, but competition outcomes that are truly comparable (in levels) across countries
are to the best of our knowledge not available.
23 The results are not shown for the sake of brevity but are presented in Table 9 of
Appendix 2. We further check the robustness of these results by incorporating additional
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explanatory variables with potential in explaining the cross-country variation in wage
gaps. In particular, we add different proxies of economic conditions, such as per capita
GDP, the general government deficit, the level of debt, and real GDP growth. It turns
out that only the general government deficit has some significant explanatory power in
accounting for the variation in the public pay gaps, and in all specifications, the size and
composition of the public workforce, as well as exposure to foreign competition, keep
their statistical significance.
24 See Table 10 of Appendix 2.
25 Results are shown in Table 11 of the Appendix 2.
26 The gap for female workers is computed by estimating Eq. (1) for the sample of
females. The gap at the first quartile of the income distribution is computed via a quantile
regression with the same covariates as Eq. (1).
27We also tried running these specifications exploiting the panel structure of EU-SILC
(2004–2012) with country fixed effects and with/without a lag of the public pay gap.
These regressions did not deliver meaningful estimates, probably due to the fact that
changes in the structural characteristics of the public labor force take some time to be
reflected on the public pay gap. For this reason, we view the long-run regressions per-
formed in Section 4 as more likely to capture the dynamic relationship between the
structural characteristics of a country and the pay gap. Moreover, we find evidence that
the recent evolution of the pay gap is explained by the process of fiscal consolidation,
rather than by the changes in the factors with explanatory power in the cross section; see
Section 3.2.
28 See Appendix IIIa of Pérez JJ et al. (2016).
29 Kaufmann et al. (2010) note that the Worldwide Governance Indicators use rea-
sonably comparable methodologies over time, then the indicators can be meaningfully
compared both across countries and over time.
Appendix 1
Data: definitions and sources




EU-SILC Number of employees in industries O, P, Q (Nace Rev. 2)




EU-SILC Number of employees in industry O (Nace Rev. 2) over





Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and
the degree of its independence from political pressures,
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and
the credibility of the government’s commitment to such
policies.
% of value added in
tradable sectors
Eurostat Gross value added in agriculture and manufacturing over









Eurostat (COFOG) Total general government (GG) compensation of
employees minus GG compensation of employees in
health, education and social protection.
Openness World Bank Exports plus imports over GDP.
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Table 7 Data: definitions and sources (Continued)
Product market
regulation
OECD Index that measures the degree to which policies
promote or inhibit competition in areas of the product
market where competition is viable.
Employment
protection legislation
OECD Indicator of the procedures and costs involved in
dismissing individuals and groups of workers. We use
version 2 of the indicator (1998–2013) for the




OECD and Visser (2013) Ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union





Visser (2013) Employees covered by collective (wage) bargaining
agreements as a proportion of all wage and salary earners
in employment with the right to bargaining, adjusted for
the possibility that some sectors or occupations are
excluded from the right to bargain.
Bargaining Table 2 of European
Commission (2014)
The predominant regime of wage setting in the
government sector is collective bargaining as opposed
to unilateral decision.
Centralization Table 2 of European
Commission (2014)
There is de jure centralization of wage updates across
the government sector as opposed to decentralization.
Log per capita GDP Eurostat Gross domestic product, chain linked volumes (2010), euro
per capita.
Deficit IMF and ECB General government deficit (excluding the government
assistance to the financial sector).
Debt IMF General government gross debt.







Cyclically adjusted primary balance excluding




OECD Number of employees in the general government sector





Eurostat Number of employees in Public Administration over total





Risk Guide (ICRG) and
Teorell et al. (2015)
The mean value of the ICRG variables “Corruption,” “Law
and Order,” and “Bureaucracy Quality,” where higher
values indicate higher quality of government. Corruption
is an assessment of corruption in the political system. Law
and Order assesses the strength and impartiality of the
legal system as well as the popular observance of the
law. Bureaucratic Quality measures the institutional
strength and quality of the bureaucracy.
Unemployment rate Eurostat Unemployment rate, annual average.
Appendix 2
Additional robustness checks of the cross-country determinants of the public pay gap
Table 8 Bivariate relationships between the government monopolistic power and the wage gap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. variable: NACE proxy to government sector wage gap (2004–2012)
% Public employees −0.0143∗∗∗
(0.0046)




% Value added tradable −0.0047
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Table 8 Bivariate relationships between the government monopolistic power and the wage gap
(Continued)
Sectors (0.0055)
Constant 0.4991∗∗∗ −0.2652∗∗∗ 0.2248∗∗∗ 0.1700
(0.1340) (0.0826) (0.0398) (0.1150)
Observations 25 25 25 24
R-squared 0.33 0.47 0.19 0.04
Notes: This table shows the bivariate regressions of the public sector pay gap on country characteristics linked to the government
monopolistic power in the provision of public services. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis
Significance levels: ∗10%; ∗∗5%; ∗∗∗1%
Table 9 Determinants of the public sector pay gap: government monopolistic power and
wage-setting institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable: NACE proxy to government sector wage gap (2004–2012)
% Public employees −0.0092∗∗ −0.0091 −0.0121∗∗ −0.0110∗∗∗ −0.0113∗∗ −0.0110∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0056) (0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0049) (0.0041)
% Public administration 0.0071∗∗ 0.0065∗∗ 0.0078∗∗∗ 0.0045∗ 0.0072∗∗ 0.0073∗∗∗
employees (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0021)
% Value added tradable −0.0078∗∗ −0.0083∗ −0.0075∗ −0.0099∗∗∗ −0.0087∗∗ −0.0082∗∗
sectors (0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0033)
Employment protection 0.0298
legislation (0.0540)
Trade union density −0.0008
(0.0014)






Real GDP growth −0.0081
(0.0113)
Constant 0.1738 0.3063 0.0482 0.4225∗∗ 0.3232 0.3244
(0.2051) (0.2130) (0.5080) (0.1850) (0.2225) (0.1928)
Observations 22 21 24 23 24 24
Adjusted R-squared 0.48 0.49 0.59 0.62 0.58 0.59
Notes: This table shows the regression of the public sector pay gap on country characteristics linked to the government
monopolistic power in the provision of public services, the labor market institutions, and the business cycle. Robust standard
errors are in parenthesis
Significance levels: ∗10%; ∗∗5%; ∗∗∗1%
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Table 10 Determinants of the public sector pay gap: sample 2004–2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable: NACE proxy to government sector wage gap (2004–2007)
% Public employees −0.0118∗∗∗ −0.0086∗∗ −0.0111∗∗∗ −0.0110∗∗∗ −0.0107∗∗∗ −0.0112∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0036) (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0031)
% Public administration 0.0056∗∗ 0.0069∗∗ 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗ 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0078∗∗∗
employees (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0020)
% Value added tradable −0.0058∗ −0.0070∗∗ −0.0061∗ −0.0076∗∗ −0.0065∗∗ −0.0063∗∗
sectors (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0024)
Employment protection 0.0268
legislation (0.0421)
Trade union density −0.0011
(0.0012)






Real GDP growth change −0.0026
(0.0072)
Constant 0.2748 0.2618 0.1751 0.3510∗∗ 0.2478 0.2777∗
(0.2025) (0.1524) (0.4858) (0.1663) (0.1729) (0.1516)
Observations 17 20 24 23 24 24
Adjusted R-squared 0.60 0.62 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.64
Notes: This table shows the correlation between the public sector pay gap and country characteristics linked to the government
monopolistic power in the provision of public services, the labor market institutions, and the business cycle. This is the analog of
Table 9 but for the sample 2004–2007 (excluding the crisis years). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis
Significance levels: ∗10%; ∗∗5%; ∗∗∗1%
Table 11 Determinants of the public administration pay gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable: public administration (industry O) wage gap (2004–2012)
% Public administration −0.0184∗ −0.0130 −0.0190∗ −0.0208∗∗ −0.0140 −0.0198∗∗
employees (over total employees) (0.0103) (0.0135) (0.0100) (0.0085) (0.0108) (0.0088)
% Public administration 0.0086∗∗ 0.0056 0.0085∗∗∗ 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0089∗∗∗
employees (over public employees) (0.0032) (0.0050) (0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022)
% Value added tradable −0.0046 −0.0041 −0.0047∗ −0.0051∗∗ −0.0044∗∗ −0.0045∗
sectors (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0023)
Employment protection 0.0018
legislation (0.0373)
Trade union density −0.0010
Debt −0.0007
(0.0004)
Real GDP growth 0.0032
(0.0081)
Constant 0.0818 0.1589∗ 0.1761 0.1534∗∗ 0.0918 0.0881
(0.0880) (0.0858) (0.3863) (0.0546) (0.0715) (0.0676)
Observations 22 21 24 23 24 24
Adjusted R-squared 0.22 0.24 0.35 0.37 0.41 0.35
Notes: This table shows the correlation between the Public Administration pay gap and country characteristics linked to the
government monopolistic power in the provision of public services, the labor market institutions, and the business cycle. This is a
table analogous to Table 9, but the wage gap is that of the Public Administration (industry O) vs. the rest of the economy,
whereas in Table 9, it is that of the NACE proxy to the government sector (industries O, P, and Q) vs. the rest of the economy. The
presence of the private sector is negligible in industry O, whereas it can have a large presence in industries P and Q, depending
on the country. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis
Significance levels: ∗10%; ∗∗5%; ∗∗∗1%
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a b
Fig. 5 Public-private pay differentials of women and low-income workers and comparison with overall pay
gaps. Notes: Panel a compares the public sector pay gap conditional on observed worker characteristics
(EU-SILC, see Eq. (1)) of the full sample and the sample of female workers. Panel b compares the pay gap of
the full sample with that of workers at the first quartile of the income distribution. The gap of female workers
is computed by estimating Eq. (1) for the sample of female workers. The gap of low-income workers is
computed via a quantile regression with the same covariates as in Eq. (1). In almost all the countries, the gaps
of women and low-income workers are larger than that of the full sample. Nevertheless, the cross-country
differences remain
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